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Abstract
The study aimed to reveal the behavior of lending and funding pricing (deposit interest rate and loan interest
rate) of Indonesian banks after the great crisis in 1998. Specifically the research design aimed to uncover the
form of interaction (state of equilibrium) and factors that might influence the state of equilibrium. We used a
model developed by Niehans (1978) and De Grauwe (1982) as a point of departure to address the research
problem. There were 12 variables used in a simultanous equation econometric model that would be estimated by
using 4 different techniques namely GMM TS, GMM CS, 3SLS and SUR. Two variables namely price of
deposit and price of loan were treated as endogenous. We also considered the impact of deposit insurance
adoption that was took place in September 2005.The empirical findings showed that the slopes of DD and LL
equation were largely consistent with the hypotheses. The parameters were positive and statistically signifi-
cant. However the numerical value of LL slope that was greater than the other one and comparable to DD slope
had raised a concern for the stability attainment. The most important variables (based on their magnitude and
statistical significance) found to affect the constellation were business prospect, system size, exchange rate,
operational cost and profitability. In the second tier of importance, we found that monetary policy instruments
(policy rate differential and base money supply), quality of loan, capital and total liquidity affected the system
in various degrees.
Keywords: deposit interest rate, Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation, loan interest rate
Bank is a business entity that deals mainly in tak-
ing deposits that are liquid and convertible on
demand and transforming them into medium/long
term loans (Mathews & Thompson, 2005). By so
doing banks take risks most notably from matu-
rity mismatch and asset quality degradation and
earn interest spread in return to cover operational
expense and profit margin.
In many countries banking is a major part of
financial system that help allocate financial re-
sources from surplus unit to deficit unit efficiently.
In this regard banking plays a vital role in financ-
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ing the most profitable and the (hopefully) most
needed productive opportunities in the economy.
Certainly many factors could affect the perfor-
mance of banking and sometimes they might de-
viate banks from attaining optimal goal from the
social perspective.
Banking Industry in Indonesia is quite an
old industry. It has important role in helping firms
to finance their business activity. Role of banking
especially pronounced since 1987 due to deregu-
lation that substantially altered the landscape and
mode of conduct. October 1987 deregulation (fa-
mously known as Pakto) has greatly eased open-
ing and operating bank business requirements  by
removing interest rate cap and licencing obstacles.
Asian crisis in 1998 is another turning point
for banking industry. The crisis revealed funda-
mental weakness in the system and as a result many
banks had to be bailed out by the state. Govern-
ment took over more than 60% banks of the sys-
tem whose cost reached more than Rp. 600 Tril-
lion (USD  67 Billions). Impact to the economy was
a catastrophe with 13% annual decline in growth
and total loss ratio to GDP estimated to be 60%
(Caprio & Kliengebiel, 2008).
This disaster changed the authority poin of
view and the new millenium marked reregulation
perspective. Realizing the grim consequences of
the loss, Bank Indonesia dramatically tightened
the approach in supervising banking industry.
New licences had beed stopped and regulator at-
tempted to right sizing the industry through
merger and acquisition.
Having been recapitalized by the state, bank-
ing industry in the early 2000’s was largely in con-
servative mode. Most banks opted to place their
money in safe haven assets such as placement in
central banks and state recap bonds. Neverthe-
less this behavior have been significantly altered
in last couple of years.
Continuing improvement in the country eco-
nomic and political stability as well as brightening
business outlook have increased banks risk appe-
tite and confidence. Excluding global crisis in 2008,
loan growth hovered around 20%-30%. Steady
inflow of deposit funding (at around 15%-20%
pace) has further supported the practices.
In light of these development, we see the
importance and value of scientific endeavour of
understanding of funding and lending behavior
of post crisis Indonesian banks. More specifically
we like to have further understanding on the be-
havior of lending and funding pricing (deposit
interest rate and loan interest rate): the form of
interaction (state of equilibrium) and factors that
might alter the interaction.  By designing a proper
research design we hope to be able to address the
following research questions: (1) how the funding
and lending activities interact? Is there an equilib-
rium that could be reach? (2) What factors could
influence the interaction? (3) Could existing litera-
ture explain the behavior? What is the best expla-
nation? (4) What are the relevant and important
findings from the study and what are the policy
implications?
The study would have a greater marginal
benefit considering that the topic is not sufficiently
explored especially in the context of emerging
market. Despite its simple and straightforward
nature, we surprisingly are not able to collect sub-
stantial amount of materials.
With these in mind, we embark with the
study. Gathering and studying the necessary lit-
erature, collecting data, designing best empirical
scheme, reviewing and analyzing results and fi-
nally concluding the available findings.
There are various theoretical explanation for
deposit mobilization and lending behavior of
banks, see Mathews & Thompson (2005) and
Freixas and Rochet (2008) for excellent review. In
this study we use a model developed by Niehans
(1978) and De Grauwe (1982). They are largely
Monti Klein model, common used in industrial
organization approach on banking behavior.
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We make use a dataset composed from
monthly banking industry aggregates from Janu-
ary 2003 to October 2011 (106 observations). Spe-
cial treatment in empirical design is utilized to ac-
commodate the operation of Indonesia Deposit
Insurance Corporation (IDIC). Literature shows
that bank and depositors behavior might be sig-
nificantly influenced by the existance of explicit
insurance scheme such as this.
The outline of exposition would go as fol-
lows: the first part conveys the introduction and
motive of the study. The theoretical background
and employed model would be put forward in the
second part. Section three gives a brief review on
existing scientifical works on the field. Part four
describes the methodological approach in the study
that subsequently be followed by analysis on the
findings. The impact of IDIC implementation would
be treated in a separate section: part six. The study
would be closed by conclusion that highlight ma-
jor findings and policy implications.
Asset Liability Management
There are various theoretical way to ap-
proach behavior of bank funding and lending. The
basic approach usually found in intermediate
macro economic (see for example Mishkin, 2008)
is the money multiplier model. Here banks and
their customers are treated as passive agents with
predictable and rigid behavior. Having known
certain characteristics like ratio of reserve to de-
posit, ratio of currency holding to deposits, ratio
of checking account to loan, etc, one could project
the outcome of expansion of a particular amount
of monetary base.
A somewhat more advanced model is done
by treating banks and their customer as competi-
tive agents. Profit maximization on price taking
behavior yields the well known preposition that
dictates both deposits and loans expansion. Banks
would produce deposits and loans to the point
where marginal revenue equals to marginal cost.
The marginal revenue is proxied by intermedia-
tion margin (spread between interest revenue and
interest expense) and marginal cost is proxied by
operating expenses and the cost in using interbank
money market.
Modern approach in modeling funding and
lending behavior utilizes micro economic ap-
proach. Early model perceived a bank as an agent
in monopoly setting (see for example: Monti, 1971
and Klein, 1972). This approach later evolved into
more competitive behavior with various oligopoly
setting that designed to address particular ques-
tion. Prisman et al. (1986) for example modeled a
cournot duopoly in an attempt to examine liquid-
ity management behavior. Santomero (1984) and
Freixas & Rochet (2008) are excellent documenta-
tions on various model of bank behavior based on
micro theoritic approach.
The model we employ here is based on the
work of Niehans (1978) and De Grauwe (1982).
We will follow closely the treatment in those
works. The starting point is recognizing the (sim-
plified) bank balance sheet equation and its objec-
tive function as follows
Banks Balance Sheet
L + R + P = D (1)
Where L is loans, R is reserve, P is placement
in interbank money market and D is deposits taken
from public. Note P in equation 1 is placed on the
left hand side of the equation if it is assumed to be
positive, on the contrary should it be negative we
could consider it as part of liabilities (right hand
side of the equation).
Banks Objective Function
= rLL + rPP - rDD C (D,L) (2)
Where rL is the yield on loan assets, rP is the
yield (and also interest cost) of money market
placement, rD is interest cost of deposits and C(.)
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is composite cost function of producing loan and
deposits.
Next we assume the behavioral equation of
(banks) deposit supply as a positive function of
intermediation margin or
 0(.)');(  hrrhD DL
s (3)
Substituting 3 to 1, we will obtain the loan
supply (implicit) function in the form of
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Where k is the reserve ratio and rp is the
interbank money market rate.
The demand for deposits and loans could
be given as follows
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d (5)
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Where X and Z are vector of exogenous vari-
ables that might influence deposits and loan tak-
ing in the part of customers.
We could combine equation 3 to 6 into equi-
librium condition of loan and deposits as followsfollows 
 )(),( DLD rrhXrD  (7)
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We could then make several comparative
statics exercises with condition 7 and 8. Two of
the most important are the stability of funding and
lending condition which are obtained through to-
tal differentiation of 7 and 8.
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Graphically the condition of 9 and 10 could
be depicted in graph 1. Both lines are postively
sloped with DD equation is larger than LL. Equi-
librium in both funding and lending are obtained
when both lines are intersected in point E with
rL=rL
1 and rD=rD
1.
LL 
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Graph 1. Equilibrium of Funding and Lending
We could obtain other variabels theoretical
conjecture as follows.
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Graph 2. Change in Equilibrium of Funding and
Lending due to Reserve Requirement
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The above quantitative projection could be
given qualitative intrepretation. For example a rise
in required reserve (perhaps imposed by the cen-
tral bank) would raise loan interest rate. A rise in
reserve ratio would shift the LL schedule above
(to LL’) since it is now costlier for banks to chan-
nel loan for every given deposit rate.
The traditional approach to view the role of
banking for the economy is through its impact on
central bank monetary channel. One of the most
influential channel by which central bank policy
affects aggregate economy activity is through com-
mercial bank intermediation.
Commercial banks do business by taking
deposits from the public and subsequently lend-
ing them and receive interest spread as a return
(Freixas & Rochet, 2008).  This so called interme-
diation activity would  create money and by do
so influence the available financing and thus busi-
ness activity (output and price). In this traditional
model, a bank is regarded as a passive entity that
pass through the money initially created in the
system (by the central bank). The behavior is as-
sumed to be stable hence the central bank could
calculate with reasonable accuracy the impact of
its monetary policy.
Money is treated as “goods” that would pro-
vide better ease and comfort in doing transaction
compared to ordinary goods (Walsh, 2010). Al-
though various assumptions and specifications
could be developed to meet the purpose at hand,
researchers typically interested in the relationship
of money creation with aggregate output and in-
terest. We will convey several influential and most
updated works on this.
Recent development has put more empha-
sized in the role of intermediation activity. This
so called credit view (Walsh, 2010) highlight the
importance of lending activity in determining
monetary policy efficacy. Various imperfections in
credit market could significantly  alter the mon-
etary policy process. These imperfections stem
from adverse selection (Jaffe & Russel, 1976),
Moral Hazard (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), Monitor-
ing Cost (Williamson, 1987) and Agency Cost
(Bernanke & Gertler, 1989). These imperfections
could result in failure of supply to meet the de-
mand, credit rationing. Furthermore interest rate
(the price of  credit) could not be expected to rem-
edy the problem.
The above market imperfections are espe-
cially important in banking, called bank lending
channel (Walsh, 2010). Given the dominant role in
the economy financing, business would find it dif-
ficult to search for alternatives in times of sudden
dried up of lending. It is not surprising then that
disruption to banking lending ability would ad-
versely affect real sector.
Despite the strong logic of credit view
arguements, researchers fail to find strong evidence
of bank lending channel. King (1986)  found that
monetary aggregates were better predictors of
future output than were bank loans. Different ap-
proach used by Kashyap et al. (1993) is trying to
differentiate bank lending channel from others.
They find that the financing mix shifts away from
bank loans after a monetary tightening move by
the central bank.
A more distinct and gaining popularity re-
search approach of bank behavior is industrial or-
ganization approach. Here the bank is modeled as
a profit maximizing firm with deposits and money
market as one of the input (in addition to the stan-
dard capital and labor) and credit is the main out-
put. One of the original work with this approach
is The Monti (1972)-Klein(1971) Model.
This initial work has been expanded to vari-
ous direction, according to purpose at hand.
Niehans (1978) and De Grauwe (1982) developed
the model as to explain the joint behavior of de-
posit and lending interest. Santomero (1984) gives
an excellent survey on early work of banking be-
havior model. Mathews & Thompson (2005) and
Freixas & Rochet (2008) summarize the more mod-
Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan | PERBANKAN
Vol. 17, No.3, September 2013: 443–462
| 448 |
ern development include among others: oligopoly
and various institutional set up.
Empirical research using the industrial or-
ganization approach mostly aims to explain the
impact of an exogenous shock to the behavior of
production ie banks output (deposit and credit)
and price (interest rate). Neumark & Sharpe (1992)
show that response of deposit rates are asymetric,
they adjust faster when they are low and slower
when they are high. Berger et al. (2004) and
Degryse & Ongena (2005) use the model to focus
on the impact of competition on price dynamics.
One of the closest recent work to ours is
Kashyap et al. (2002). Drawing from the work of
Diamond & Dybvig (1983), they model banking
business as liquidity provider hence attempt to
show the co existance of lending and deposit tak-
ing in the bank. The logical flow follows like this:
bank is in a business of liquidity provision to its
clients. To meet this end, it could use outside fi-
nance (money market) or pursue more stable fund-
ing through selling deposits. In the presence of
market imperfection namely (1) volatile external
finance cost and (2) high cost of maintaining buffer
stock, it can be shown that there exist an optimal
mix of market versus deposit funding that depends
to various factors.
They attempt to verify the theorem using
firm level quarterly data from 9262 banks during
period of 1992:1 to 1996:4. They run two OLS re-
gressions using ratio of liquid assets (cash + secu-
rities) to total assets (called LIQRAT) and ratio of
securities to total assets (called SECRAT). The ra-
tio of transacting deposits to total deposits (called
DEPRAT) is used as an independent variable along
with various controlling variables. They found a
positive and statistically significant estimate that
in line with the hypotheses.
The price of deposit paid by banks also could
be explained by market discipline mechanism. This
approach assumes that the public exerts influence
over banks behavior through market: deposits,
stocks and other claims. Investors and depositors
would avoid and/or reduce exposure to banks
considered ill managed (too risky). These banks
would find itself hard to fund its business. This
principle is logically sound and indeed Bank for
International Settlement (BIS) has put forward the
idea as one of the three pillars of ideal banking
system (BASEL II) in additon to capital adequacy
and regulatory supervision. Interested readers
could further consult Landskroner & Paroush
(2008)  and Stephanou (2010) on theoretical de-
tails.
Deposit insurance is a scheme to restore and
preserve the confidence of the public to the bank-
ing system. By establishing formal guarantee of
deposits repayment, authorities hope that the per-
vasive problem of bank run could be contained.
Though the first scheme was introduced in 1934
in United States, deposit insurance gains popular-
ity following the decade of crisis in 1990’s. During
1995-2003, countried adopted explicit deposit in-
surance have increased by 80%, from 49 to 87
(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2008).
The stabilizing banking system argument of
deposit protection implementation is still hotly
debatable. The existance of deposit insurance
would reduce early withdrawal as foreseen by
Diamond & Dybvig (1983) since there is no need
to be the first in line. On the other hand, a com-
prehensive empirical investigation by Demirguc-
Kunt & Detragiache (2002) showed that the imple-
mentation increases the likelihood of crisis when
the institutional set up is weak and deposit pro-
tection scope is extensive.
Our research is different with the previous
works in several ways: (1) the study is an attempt
to revisit a somewhat old model but we think have
powerful insights and implications that still under
explored. We put more emphasis on empirical work
hence highlight the practical aspect of this simple
theoretical model. (2) Rather studying the firm
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data, we use aggregated (banking system) data.
In line with Monti-Klein spirit, we hope the micro
behavior of banks would be depicted finely in the
aggregated view. In so doing we hope for more
useful and policy relevant insights. (3) The study
accounts for the impact of deposit protection
mechanism. As mentioned by studies cited before,
this mechanism could potentially affect market
discipline unfavorably.  (4) Data set up is Indone-
sian banking, one of the largest developing coun-
tries. Studies on banking behavior in developing
countries are still relatively rare. Therefore we
hope it would result in more marginal scientifical
benefit.
METHOD
To verify the conjecture put forth by the
above theoretical model, we employ simultanous
econometric modeling. Simultanous econometric
modeling is suitable to deal with variables that
have contemporanous and two way causation (Heij
et al, 2005). In this regard, relationship among
variables is specified in a structural manner involv-
ing several equations. Several estimation technique
could then be applied, among other General Meth-
ods of Moments (GMM), Seemingly Unrelated
Regression (SUR) and Three Stage Least Squares
(3SLS).
Appriorily we are not favoring any of the
technique. We more concern on the results consis-
tency with different technique provided they pass
the endogeneity test. To this end, we are estimat-
ing the simultanous specification with various tech-
nique and highlight whether there is a consistency
with the result.
The estimated econometric model could be
proposed as follows
Where
rD = proxy of deposit price
rL = proxy of loan price
XRB = vector of banks risk and business activities
XM = vector of macro economic  variables
vL and vD are idiosyncratic error that are assumed
to be not correlated to each other.
We employ a monthly dataset of banking
and economic aggregates from period of January
2003 to October 2011 (106 observations). The data
was obtained from Bank Indonesia and CEIC data
feeder. The study involves 12 variabels/instru-
ments in which 2 variabels are assumed to be en-
dogenous. We also utilize instruments constructed
from lagged values of existing variables where
deemed to be necessary.
We also test whether the implementation of
IDIC has possibly altered banks behavior. To this
end we use IDIC as a dummy variable which has
value of zero for time periode before the opera-
tional of IDIC (September 2005) and one after that.
Specification for the D_IDIC includes as both a one
off effect (event marker) and interaction terms.
We interact the D_IDIC with endogenous  vari-
ables: rL and rD.
Some variables like depo, loan, assets, gdpn
and m0 are converted to log form for standard
empirical reasons: reducing for possibility of
heterocedasticity and outlier and elasticity
intrepretation.
Not all variables affect the equilibrium rate
of loan and deposit (entering in each of DD and
LL). Several variabels are most deemed  to be rel-
evant in Deposit Equilibrium Equation (DD) while
the others perhaps could be thought best explain
the Loan Equilibrium Equation (LL).  In this re-
gard we classify the exogenous variables in the
Table 1 into DD and LL variables (also with the
expected algebraic sign) as follows.
 
        DMRBLD
LMRBDL
vXXrr
vXXrr


3210
3210


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Table 1. List of Variables and Instruments
Table 2. Classification of Explanatory Variables and
Expected Sign
Variables Classifi-cation 
Expected Sign 
(for equilibrium 
rL and/or rD) 
Capital LL Negative 
Quality of Loan LL Positive 
Total liquidity Both. Positive  
System Size DD Negative 
Operational 
Efficiency 
DD Positive 
Profitability LL Positive 
Business Activity Both Positive 
Level of 
Exchange Rate 
LL Positive 
Base money 
supply 
DD Negative 
Interest rate 
differential 
DD Positive 
The model satisfy the order condition for
identification (in fact the model is overidentified).
The DD equation has one right hand side endog-
enous variable (l_yield or r_cred) while it has 4
excluded exogenous variables namely capital, qual-
ity of loan, profitability and level of exchange rate.
The LL equation also has one right hand side en-
dogenous variable (icof or r_dep) while it has 5
excluded exogenous variables namely system size,
operational efficiency, base money supply, domes-
tic and foreign policy rate.
Most of the algebraic expected sign hypoth-
esized above derived from logic and common
sense. The impact of capital is well recognized to
the lending process. Higher capitalized banks tend
to be more aggressive in making loan and to
achieve that they more willing to offer lower rate.
Variables/Instruments Description, Proxy and Notation 
Endogenous variables  
Price of Deposits Realization proxy: the ratio of interest rate expense to third party funding, 
also widely known as Implied Cost of Fund. Notation: ICOF 
Price of Loans Realization proxy: the ratio of interest rate revenue to total loans (implied 
loan rate). Notation: L_yield 
Bank Risks and Business 
Activities Variables 
 
Capital Capital owned by banks which is proxied by capital adequacy ratio: CAR 
(in percentage). Notation:CAR 
Quality of Loan Ratio of non performing loan (gross) to total loan. Notation: NPL 
Total liquidity Ratio of total banking loan to deposit in particular periode. Notation: LDR  
System Size Value of  total asset in billion Rupiah. Notation: Asset. 
Operational Efficiency Ratio of non interest expense to total asset, measuring how much is the cost 
to maintain Rp. 1 Assets. Notation: Ast_Cost  
Profitability Ratio of net interest revenue: interest revenue minus interest cost to earning 
assets (net interest margin). Notation: NIM 
Macro Economic Variables  
Business Activity National output measured by gross domestic product at current price. 
Notation: GDP_NL  
Level of Exchange Rate The value of national currency (Rupiah) as measured by amount of rupiah 
per USD. Notation: IDR_l.      
Base money supply Amount of base money supply (currency in circulation plus banks reserve) 
in Billion Rupiah. Notation: M0_l 
Interest rate differential: 
Domestic Policy rate - Foreign 
Policy Rate  
Difference of Benchmark rate set by BI and The Fed as monetary 
instrument. Notation: R_ID - R_US  
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The same could be said for the impact of loan qual-
ity, profitability  and level of exchange rate. They
are maintaining sufficient  risk appetite necessary
for expanding loan.
On the other hand assets and operational
efficiency could be related to ease of conducting
intermediation. Larger assets and more efficiency
should support public confidence to store money
in the banks, thus decrease their required return.
In light of this, we view the increase in asset and
efficiency as more favorably affect the deposit
market (DD equation).
Total liquidity (as measured by LDR) and
business activity affect both LL and DD. Higher
LDR means smaller liquidity available in the sys-
tem. Thus banks would compete more fiercely for
the available funds (hence affect the DD equation).
Furthermore facing tighter liquidity, it is custom-
arily for banks to also reduce the credit expan-
sion. They don’t want to get caught in an adverse
liquidity gap that could be detrimental for their
profitability. The impact of business activity could
be inferred from Macro Economics Theory of ag-
gregate demand and supply. Higher business ac-
tivity would reduce the real balance of money stock
hence would increase its price (interest rate).
Other macro economics variables also use
the same logic. A rise in base money would de-
press interbank rate that could ease banks fund-
ing need from the public. The same logic though
somewhat reversed applies to domestic interest
rate (central bank rate).  Exchange rate impact as-
sume to impact more adversely in loan producing
process. Higher exchange rate (depreciation) is
considered as an increase in business uncertainty
hence act as an inhibitation for banks risk appe-
tite. Foreign interest rate could affect negatively
to deposit market since consumers now would
probably prefer to invest overseas.
Since we are estimating a simultanous equa-
tion econometric model, we have to employ in-
struments. We use several instruments based on
logic and theoretical reasons. The validity of in-
struments are tested using J Statistics (Hausman,
1978) that verify the correlation degree between
instruments and residuals. The list of instruments
are car(-1) nim ast_cost (r_id-r_us) ldr(-1) idr_l
gdp_nl npl(-1) m0_l.
RESULT
In this part we will first present the descrip-
tive statistics to inform the reader on the statistics
profile of variables used in the study. We will con-
vey the result of the estimation and notes on the
econometrics works in the next sub section. Infer-
ence and analysis on empirical findings would be
delivered in three separated parts. We will focus
in the relationship of funding and lending first.
The impact of banking aggregates on this relation-
ship would be highlighted in the subsequent part.
We will complete the discussion with the review
on influence of macro variables: business activity
and risk appetite.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports basic statistical properties of
variables used in the study. Most of the variables
have been converted to percentage, hence compa-
rable to each other and makes intrepretation of
further process result easier. Though there are
several variabels that have quite distance value
(maximum-minimum), we think that there is no
outlier in the data.
We should take a note that the study cover
a period in which the banking system undergoing
a structural and positive trend in behavior. After
the 1998 crisis, many major banks were heavily
recapitalized. As a result state bond is dominant
in many banks book and risk appetite is severely
curtailed. This is a relevant situation between 2003-
2006 period. As memory of crisis faded and
pushed by more agressive profit seeking motive,
banks expanded the lending substantially in later
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period (2006-2011). We control this factor through
nominal output, that accounts for better prospect
through both higher growth and inflation.
Data coverage also includes few depressed
periods namely: July-Des 2005 and Aug 2008-
March 2009. The first period is triggered by fuel
price hike and funds massive withdrawal and the
second is triggered by global crisis. We view that
in both periods though the economic and banking
situation is depressed however it is not extreme
hence no further treatment is necessary.
Estimation Results and Notes
As stated above we will run the regression
using two proxies for each variables: price of credit
and price of deposit, namely realization based (im-
plied cost of fund:ICOF and loan yield: l_yield)
and announcement (counter rate deposits: r_dep
and published loan rate: r_cred). For robustness
check we employ 4 methods of estimation for each
regression: GMM Time Series (GMM TS), GMM
Cross Section (GMM CS), SUR and 3 SLS.
Table 2 reports the estimation result scheme
not account for IDIC implementation.
Sample: 2003M01 2011M10       
 R_DEPO R_CRED ICOF L_YIELD CAR NPL LDR ASSETL 
 Mean  5.690434  15.01292  6.350486  20.50207  19.73116  5.223741  66.28880  14.39741 
 Median  4.952547  14.82150  5.707657  19.13618  19.60000  4.945000  63.62028  14.37269 
 Maximum  10.77409  18.74200  11.06161  36.37974  25.30000  8.420000  87.17913  15.04149 
 Minimum  4.061194  12.84700  4.415728  14.01400  16.44000  2.562003  43.63566  13.89316 
 Std. Dev.  1.568229  1.434917  1.635777  5.225360  2.189484  1.893716  11.57430  0.344473 
 Skewness  1.400612  0.715112  1.263157  1.061351  0.268093  0.219161 -0.136560  0.155448 
 Kurtosis  4.356727  3.061451  3.552830  3.569534  2.020199  1.593644  1.996711  1.756323 
 Jarque-Bera  42.78676  9.051143  29.53815  21.33352  5.509814  9.584006  4.775229  7.258300 
 Probability  0.000000  0.010829  0.000000  0.000023  0.063615  0.008296  0.091849  0.026539 
 Sum  603.1860  1591.369  673.1515  2173.220  2091.503  553.7166  7026.613  1526.126 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  258.2310  216.1937  280.9553  2866.960  503.3531  376.5468  14066.26  12.45945 
 Observations  106  106  106  106  106  106  106  106 
  AST_COST OCOI NIM ROA GDP_NL IDR_L M0_L R_ID R_US 
 Mean  0.072972  88.71371  5.603679  2.714203  11.96192  9.134299  12.48996  8.970561  2.077830 
 Median  0.065322  87.58326  5.730000  2.705000  11.97323  9.121673  12.57962  8.156940  1.250000 
 Maximum  0.175656  123.2600  6.400000  3.520000  12.52488  9.422221  13.34621  14.59615  5.250000 
 Minimum  0.046609  75.20000  4.200000  1.270000  11.39180  9.020994  11.60988  6.098000  0.250000 
 Std. Dev.  0.022983  6.527612  0.435230  0.362332  0.341476  0.074922  0.446236  2.225587  1.877613 
 Skewness  2.281505  2.413370 -1.979075 -0.557715 -0.142304  1.588196 -0.293939  0.995180  0.619357 
 Kurtosis  8.244167  12.76967  6.220536  4.454142  1.718700  6.203250  2.299171  2.878329  1.840873 
 Jarque-Bera  213.4237  524.4517  115.0047  14.83432  7.536953  89.88036  3.695702  17.39648  12.71111 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000601  0.023087  0.000000  0.157575  0.000167  0.001737 
 Sum  7.735023  9403.653  593.9900  287.7056  1256.002  968.2357  1323.936  941.9089  220.2500 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.055461  4474.021  19.88967  13.78490  12.12703  0.589391  20.90826  515.1367  370.1704 
Observations  106  106  106  106  105  106  106  105  106 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (I)
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics (II)
We find that the slope of DD and LL equation =  
 
D
L
r
r


are positive as expected and highly significant.
These findings are consistent regardless estima-
tors used, indicating their robustness. We also find
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that the slope of DD is greater than 1  (between
1.99 to 2.27) and also greater than LL in line with
the theoretical conjecture.  However the slope  LL
equation also greater than one  (between 1.27 to
1.74).
The model is quite well specified. The J sta-
tistics that evaluate overidentifying restrictions:
instruments do not correlate with the model re-
siduals lays in the accepting area. From Table 2
we could see, for example, the residual determi-
nant covariance of model of DD equation estimated
by GMM TS is 0.0682 while using GMM CS it is
0.0725. These correspond with p value of 0.0817
and 0.239 respectively, that is the null hypotheses
of no correlation could not be rejected.
Table 3 and 4 reports the estimation result
using scheme that considers the impact of  IDIC
implementation. The algebraic signs are the same
however the magnitudes are somewhat smaller for
DD equation and somewhat greater for LL equa-
tion. Nevertheless the IDIC interaction terms have
taken place the difference.
The l_yield parameters (in DD equation) take
values of 0.329 to 0.394 in which the interaction
terms take values of 0.130 to 0.199. The icof pa-
rameters on the other hand take values of 2.345 to
3.049 in which the interaction terms take values of
-0.550 to -0.232. The scheme has separated the
magnitude of responses to IDIC implementation
quite well.
Nevertheless the reliability of instruments
are falling under the scheme that accounts for IDIC
implementation. The p values of J statistics are
decreasing from 0.816 to 0.053 (GMM TS estima-
tor) and 0.239 to 0.058 (GMM CS estimator) re-
spectively. Therefore we have to be cautious in
intrepreting the result from the latter scheme.
Variables 
Coefficients (p value in parenthenses) 
GMM TS GMM CS 3SLS SUR 
Coeff. P value Coeff. P value Coeff. P value Coeff. P value 
DD Equation 
(dep var: icof) 
        
Constant -18.23041 0.0017 -21.94286 0.0000 -27.18896 0.0000 -31.05126 0.0000 
L_Yield 0.433651 0.0000 0.455120 0.0000 0.472584 0.0000 0.473322 0.0000 
Asset_l -5.743315 0.0001 -5.619841 0.0000 -3.833590 0.0003 -2.336807 0.0010 
Ast_cost -2.921855 0.2294 -4.378354 0.0129 -4.495567 0.0085 -1.834276 0.2053 
LDR -0.000937 0.9592 0.001484 0.9064 0.015592 0.2989 0.020220 0.0464 
R_ID-R_US 0.090349 0.0000 0.092812 0.0000 0.089631 0.0000 0.087991 0.0000 
GDP_NL 7.270512 0.0000 7.389060 0.0000 5.701043 0.0000 4.739474 0.0000 
M0_l 0.882762 0.1295 0.882075 0.0348 0.760498 0.0677 0.225315 0.5662 
LL Equation (dep 
var: l_yield) 
        
Constant 129.6049 0.0000 130.1895 0.0000 109.4157 0.0000 100.8397 0.0000 
ICOF 2.685878 0.0000 2.741017 0.0000 2.665225 0.0000 1.888670 0.0000 
NIM 0.954610 0.5033 1.351594 0.1954 1.393882 0.0553 -0.169029 0.4077 
CAR 0.047654 0.7429 0.002450 0.9837 0.038061 0.7063 0.242789 0.0000 
NPL -0.640680 0.0574 -0.732874 0.0018 -0.646645 0.0003 -0.230072 0.0000 
IDR_l -5.827032 0.0000 -5.331609 0.0000 -3.136980 0.0052 -3.765920 0.0000 
LDR -0.047761 0.1072 -0.060280 0.0137 -0.066229 0.0379 -0.075719 0.0000 
GDP_NL -6.080666 0.0005 -6.536012 0.0000 -6.516396 0.0000 -4.642534 0.0000 
Goodness Fit         
Det. Residual 
Cov. 
0.068223  0.072568  0.047378  0.015205  
J Statistics 0.081661  0.239145      
Table 5. Estimation Result Initial Scheme
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Variables R_DEPO R_CRED ICOF L_YIELD CAR NPL LDR ASSETL AST_COST 
R_DEPO  1.000000  0.908628  0.877369  0.768476  0.536829  0.710467 -0.595718 -0.535428 -0.074203 
R_CRED  0.908628  1.000000  0.912371  0.912072  0.687007  0.788951 -0.787592 -0.726384 -0.041022 
ICOF  0.877369  0.912371  1.000000  0.901808  0.632358  0.697732 -0.676895 -0.582914  0.022801 
L_YIELD  0.768476  0.912072  0.901808  1.000000  0.829320  0.772796 -0.887169 -0.822740 -0.004598 
CAR  0.536829  0.687007  0.632358  0.829320  1.000000  0.725681 -0.796415 -0.805886 -0.006912 
NPL  0.710467  0.788951  0.697732  0.772796  0.725681  1.000000 -0.783582 -0.813569 -0.095316 
LDR -0.595718 -0.787592 -0.676895 -0.887169 -0.796415 -0.783582  1.000000  0.892765  0.062478 
ASSETL -0.535428 -0.726384 -0.582914 -0.822740 -0.805886 -0.813569  0.892765  1.000000  0.144338 
AST_COST -0.074203 -0.041022  0.022801 -0.004598 -0.006912 -0.095316  0.062478  0.144338  1.000000 
OCOI  0.413597  0.357575  0.454170  0.321860  0.162117  0.278796 -0.157593 -0.057297  0.625841 
NIM -0.622163 -0.661880 -0.709507 -0.670033 -0.324717 -0.306291  0.475598  0.393510  0.220377 
ROA -0.635522 -0.613072 -0.583211 -0.493754 -0.199940 -0.561169  0.353065  0.382876  0.009077 
GDP_NL -0.529412 -0.728706 -0.589445 -0.842532 -0.797203 -0.779340  0.915909  0.989226  0.140444 
IDR_L  0.012780 -0.098814 -0.225461 -0.369540 -0.376797 -0.165410  0.318072  0.207760 -0.028046 
M0_L -0.586749 -0.792885 -0.654970 -0.878050 -0.767848 -0.742427  0.908727  0.959153  0.111563 
R_ID  0.733816  0.566405  0.479320  0.364328  0.268680  0.652567 -0.301308 -0.414081 -0.068750 
R_US  0.291550  0.248800  0.249685  0.227102  0.483018  0.630128 -0.284158 -0.379762 -0.157428 
Table 6. Correlations Statistic (I)
Variables OCOI NIM ROA GDP_NL IDR_L M0_L R_ID R_US 
R_DEPO  0.413597 -0.622163 -0.635522 -0.529412  0.012780 -0.586749  0.733816  0.291550 
R_CRED  0.357575 -0.661880 -0.613072 -0.728706 -0.098814 -0.792885  0.566405  0.248800 
ICOF  0.454170 -0.709507 -0.583211 -0.589445 -0.225461 -0.654970  0.479320  0.249685 
L_YIELD  0.321860 -0.670033 -0.493754 -0.842532 -0.369540 -0.878050  0.364328  0.227102 
CAR  0.162117 -0.324717 -0.199940 -0.797203 -0.376797 -0.767848  0.268680  0.483018 
NPL  0.278796 -0.306291 -0.561169 -0.779340 -0.165410 -0.742427  0.652567  0.630128 
LDR -0.157593  0.475598  0.353065  0.915909  0.318072  0.908727 -0.301308 -0.284158 
ASSETL -0.057297  0.393510  0.382876  0.989226  0.207760  0.959153 -0.414081 -0.379762 
AST_COST  0.625841  0.220377  0.009077  0.140444 -0.028046  0.111563 -0.068750 -0.157428 
OCOI  1.000000 -0.165498 -0.488209 -0.064951  0.039879 -0.105761  0.349793  0.011606 
NIM -0.165498  1.000000  0.511778  0.451976  0.208641  0.560451 -0.202681  0.241373 
ROA -0.488209  0.511778  1.000000  0.375791 -0.084726  0.422829 -0.629956 -0.088174 
GDP_NL -0.064951  0.451976  0.375791  1.000000  0.237007  0.972584 -0.356686 -0.289530 
IDR_L  0.039879  0.208641 -0.084726  0.237007  1.000000  0.181302  0.276270 -0.028317 
M0_L -0.105761  0.560451  0.422829  0.972584  0.181302  1.000000 -0.342731 -0.170912 
R_ID  0.349793 -0.202681 -0.629956 -0.356686  0.276270 -0.342731  1.000000  0.514658 
R_US  0.011606  0.241373 -0.088174 -0.289530 -0.028317 -0.170912  0.514658  1.000000 
Table 7. Correlations Statistic (II)
Behavior of Funding and Lending
Table 5 reports the result of estimation for
DD and LL equation. We need to invert the find-
ings (L_yield) to be in line with the theoretical
preposition. The estimation result shows that all
parameters are positive and significant as expected.
The coefficient for DD equation ranges from 2.114
(=1/0.473) to 2.309 (=1/0.433). These findings are
in line with the theory.  On the other hand the
coefficient of LL equation (ICOF parameter) ranges
from 1.889 to 2.741. These findings are somewhat
different from what initially conjectured that the
LL slope should be less than 1 and lesser than DD.
These findings are important. The stablity
condition requires that DD equation slope be posi-
tive and higher than LL. We could deduce this
conclusion from the standard demand supply equi-
librium characteristics. Should the DD equation be
flatter than LL, equilibrium deposit interest rate
would fail to clear the loan market. We could evalu-
ate this preposition qualitatively with graph 2.
Behavior of Funding and Lending Pricing of Indonesian Banks: Evidence from Aggregate Post Crisis Data
Soenartomo Soepomo & Moch. Doddy Ariefianto
| 455 |
LL DD 
rD 
rL 
rL1 
rD1 
E1 
LL’ 
E2 
DD LL LL’ 
rD 
rL 
E1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Graph 3a. shows that standard case as as-
sumed in the beginning of the paper. Suppose ini-
tially  both deposits and loan market clears at E1.
An exogenous shock happens to alter the LL equa-
tion to LL’. The loan rate implied by the initial equi-
librium would be too low, bank now requires more.
The equilibrating process would go first by jump-
ing to LL’ and gradually move along the curve un-
til it intersects with DD (see the bold arrow). How-
ever with the case of LL slope greater than DD, the
equilibrating process is unstable. While the bank
require more yield from its loan, the deposit mar-
ket fails to meet this shift (see the bold arrow).
What cause this phenomenon? We could
adress this to two reasons . First, higher LL slope
signifies greater response of credit activity to fund-
ing than the other way around. This signifies the
strain in funding, more intense competition in de-
posit market. This could be due to the fact that
loan growth is higher than deposit growth. In In-
donesia average annual loan growth is around
30% to 50% higher than deposits growth. Second,
since we also expect higher DD elasticity due to
the work of market discipline mechanism then the
estimated result shows the lack of it. We think
further research should investigate the findings
a. Case of Slope DD greater than LL b. Case of Slope LL greater than DD
Graph 3. Stability Requirement in DD and LL Slope
and more micro oriented approach (unlike our
macro approach) would be more advantegous.
We now move to evaluating the impact of
exogenous shocks. We will first review the com-
mon characteristics (variables that appear in both
DD and LL equation) before the specific variables.
The system liquidity proxy: LDR has a incor-
rect parameter sign in DD and LL equation with
numerical value ranging from -0.075 to -0.0009.
Accepted significance is obtained in LL equation
from GMM CS, 3SLS and SUR estimator. These
parameters suggest that an increase in LDR would
correspond to a decrease in equilibrium interest rate.
The incorrect sign (and somewhat large)
parameters of LL equation have came as an in-
triguing result. We argue that higher LDR has been
taken as a signal of heightened competition in lend-
ing. Since we have controlled the business pros-
pect variable, then bank would be tempted to of-
fer better price to win the competition.
The business prospect variable as proxied
by nominal GDP has correct sign and is significant
in DD equation. Better (macro) economic condi-
tion would increase lending opportunities but the
competition would also get more intense. Quite
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substantial parameter values obtained, in magni-
tude of 4.74 to 7.39, one of the largest in the model,
gives impression that business prospect is one
major driver in the setting of lending and funding
behavior.
The parameters change sign but remain sig-
nificant in LL equation. The numerical value ob-
tained ranges from -6.53 to -4.64. We think better
prospect is also taken by banks as signal of elevated
competition. To retain market portion (or win it
over), banks would likely use price as their main
strategy.
The net effect of business prospect in DD
and LL equation is still positive (in range of 0.1 to
0.86). Better business prospect would increase
equilibrium deposit and loan interest rate.
The system size variable (as proxied by log
of asset) is large (value ranging from -5.74 to -
2.34) and highly significant. The findings are con-
sistent with the initial hypotheses. It seems that
public confidence has increased in line with the
size. Depositors feel safer to put their saving in an
increasingly larger system hence demand smaller
return. This findings could be verified with fur-
ther studies especially those using bank level data.
It is certainly logical that larger bank could pay
less for deposits compares to small ones.
The efficiency variable as proxied by ast_cost
are found to be negative in the magnitude of -4.49
to -1.83. The parameters are statistically signifi-
cant when obtained by GMM CS and 3SLS estima-
tors. These findings are somewhat inconsistent
with the initial hypotheses. The negative param-
eters suggest that higher operational cost associ-
ate with lower deposit rate. The findings are con-
sistent with the hypotheses. Banks pass the higher
operational cost to the customers via the higher
price of deposit, which is reflected in lower inter-
est rate offer.
There is also significant positive relationship
of deposit rate and international interest parity
(here proxied by difference in policy rate between
Indonesia and US). The magnitude is not particu-
larly high: between 0.088 and 0.092. We think this
is the standard monetary policy effect working
through bank lending channel (Walsh, 2010). As
the central bank attempt to cool the economy by
raising policy rate, and reflected through inter-
bank money market, banks would accomodate the
move.
The other monetary policy proxy, base
money, is not statistically significant (except using
GMM CS estimator). It seems that the effect of the
policy has largely been taken by the policy rate.
Since 2005, Bank Indonesia officially implemented
inflation targeting framework monetary regime
with interest rate as its main policy instruments
(called BI rate). We think the practice has
preceeded before the formal announcement.
On the LL equation side, we notice that Net
Interest Margin (NIM) parameters have positive
sign but only 3SLS parameter is significant. The
magnitude of variable are ranging from -0.169 to
0.955.  We think this finding is quite important. It
gives an insight that in better managing monetary
policy, the central bank should pay attention to
the bank nim. It measures bank drive for profit-
ability that could affect the pricing of lending.
The impact of CAR is positive but only sig-
nificant with SUR estimator. The parameters mag-
nitude are ranging from 0.0024 to 0.243. The find-
ings are inconsistent with the hypotheses. Higher
CAR is associated with higher lending rate. It
seems that higher capital would reduce somewhat
risk appetite. We could addresss this a way of capi-
tal preservation.
However we should take a special note in
the case of Indonesia. Banks were heavily recapi-
talized after the 1998 crisis in which they hold a
substantial portion of government bond in their
book. The recapitalization condition came with a
strict supervisory condition attached. During the
first part of the decade (2000-2005), lending activ-
ity was conservative. However as memory fades
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and regulator increasing awareness for growth
have put the condition more favorable.
The parameters of credit quality are nega-
tive and highly significant. The magnitudes range
from -0.73 to -0.23. These findings are inconsis-
tent with the initial hypotheses. We think these
findings are due to unique data characteristics.
Indonesia banking industry exhibit a somewhat
unconventional feature. The loan quality was low
for most of the part of early period (before 2005,
in which NPL were ranging around 5%-6%) and
low loan expansion (around 10-15% annually). In
the other end of the period, the characteristics
changed with NPL substantially reduced to aroud
2.3% and loan expansion hovered around 20%-24%.
Exchange rate has a large negative and sta-
tistically significant impact to lending rate (with
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Graph 4. The Loan Yield and Depreciation
Variables 
Coefficients (p value in parenthenses) 
GMM TS GMM CS 3SLS SUR 
Coeff. P value Coeff. P value Coeff. P value Coeff. P value 
DD Equation         
Constant -31.23746 0.0597 -35.67690 0.0017 -31.67718 0.0006 -30.91485 0.0000 
L_Yield 0.329424 0.0000 0.346441 0.0000 0.340783 0.0000 0.393918 0.0000 
Asset_l 7.492634 0.1755 8.658085 0.0231 10.22399 0.0003 2.096452 0.0093 
Ast_cost -6.980452 0.0487 -9.085489 0.0007 -8.681282 0.0007 -4.576722 0.0002 
LDR 0.023461 0.4375 0.039282 0.1391 0.045235 0.0354 0.026141 0.0015 
R_ID-R_US 0.075082 0.0222 0.075621 0.0032 0.066384 0.0255 0.088074 0.0000 
GDP_NL -4.531039 0.3552 -5.430362 0.1235 -7.485093 0.0064 1.044535 0.2270 
M0_l -1.992328 0.0574 -2.226283 0.0025 -2.422826 0.0026 -1.264747 0.0007 
IDIC -2.442069 0.4182 -2.789754 0.1822 -2.122572 0.1606 -1.965068 0.0006 
IDIC*L_Yield 0.175825 0.2051 0.198882 0.0371 0.183042 0.0052 0.130528 0.0000 
LL Equation         
Constant 81.35445 0.0520 95.19103 0.0068 71.48503 0.0982 67.56130 0.0000 
ICOF 2.726157 0.0003 3.049224 0.0000 3.028929 0.0000 2.345010 0.0000 
NIM 1.386593 0.4932 2.471135 0.1630 2.538865 0.1071 0.915971 0.0031 
CAR 0.194013 0.0624 0.086490 0.3542 0.193563 0.0531 0.258129 0.0000 
NPL -0.296385 0.2189 -0.438138 0.0174 -0.330792 0.1324 -0.084534 0.1230 
IDR_l -4.576783 0.0807 -5.028565 0.0158 -4.172833 0.1044 -3.113173 0.0000 
LDR -0.017967 0.5034 -0.019402 0.4165 -0.013109 0.6675 -0.053878 0.0000 
GDP_NL -3.699813 0.0060 -4.931909 0.0000 -3.856825 0.0007 -3.250120 0.0000 
IDIC -0.044508 0.9940 0.588369 0.8963 0.854693 0.8676 2.116111 0.0105 
IDIC*L_Yield -0.231704 0.8099 -0.350291 0.6433 -0.474036 0.5820 -0.550071 0.0000 
Goodness Fit         
Det. Residual Cov. 0.032515  0.059154  0.058967  0.005709  
J Statistics 0.053230  0.059141      
Table 8. Estimation Result of the Impact of IDIC
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magnitude of -5.82 to -3.13). This finding is con-
tradicting the hypotheses. We think this also could
be attributed the data characteristics. As can be
seen from Graph 4, the loan yield experienced a
steady declining trend during the study period,
in which there are several interrupting bouts of
depreciation. The latter effect dominated the first.
The Impact of Deposit Insurance Scheme
The implementation of deposit insurance
scheme (IDIC) does alter the DD and LL equa-
tion. We could view the impact in general or spe-
cific perspective. By general, we mean that the
impact of IDIC implementation would shift the
whole DD and LL schedule, while for specific we
mean for more localized impact to particular vari-
ables. Due to limitation of degree of freedom, we
only asess the impact to rD and rL (the interaction
terms of IDIC dummy with the price of credit and
deposit).
The overall impact of IDIC implementation
is of limited significance. Only parameters obtained
from SUR estimator are found to be significant. In
LL equation the parameter is found to be nega-
tive with the magnitude of -1.965 and in DD equa-
tion it is positive with size of 2.116. We do not
think this finding would alter the results obtained
previously.
Interaction terms for l_yield (DD equation)
are found to be positive and significant with mag-
nitude ranging from 0.13 to 0.199. The parameters
are significant using GMM CS, 3SLS and SUR esti-
mators. Nevertheless we also find that the initial
l_yield parameters are smaller compared to sample
without accounting for IDIC implementation. The
net effect is not altered too much ie the slope is
still positive and greater than one.
On the other hand, the interaction terms of
icof (LL equation) are found to be negative and
only significant using SUR estimator. The magni-
tude ranges from -0.55 to -0.23. However the ini-
tial icof parameters are somewhat larger compared
to sample without accounting for IDIC implemen-
tation. This gives impression that the IDIC imple-
mentation has increased the response of loan rate
to changes in equilibrium deposit rate.
The scheme that accounts for IDIC has al-
tered several variables significantly. The LDR pa-
rameter experiences a decrease in significance
though we do not think the magnitude changes
significantly.
Under empirical scheme that not accounted
for IDIC implementation, the algebraic and numeri-
cal values of GDP_NL in DD equation are positive
in the range of 4.74 to 7.39. The parameters are all
significant. Nevertheless when we consider the
IDIC impact, the algebraic and numerical values
are changed dramatically. The parameters are
negative in the range of  -7.48 to -4.53, the excep-
tion is for parameters obtained from SUR estima-
tors which is still positive 1.04. Except for 3SLS
estimator, the parameters are not statistically sig-
nificant.
On the other hand, in the LL equation while
the result of IDIC considered scheme retains their
algebraic signs (which are negative) however their
magnitude are greatly reduced. The values now
range from -4.932 to -3.25, largely halved from the
previous scheme whose value range from -6.53 to
-4.64. It seems that the implementation of IDIC
has dampened the intensity of competition in lend-
ing market triggered by better business prospect.
A substantial departure is also experienced
by size variable. In previous scheme the impact of
increasing banking system size is negative for cost
of funding (in the order of -5.74 to -2.33). How-
ever if we take control the influence of IDIC imple-
mentation, the estimated conclusion is reversed.
The parameters now are positive in the range of
2.09 to 10.22. Except estimate obtained under
GMM TS, the parameters are statistically signifi-
cant.
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We think the latter findings could be spuri-
ous. Radical changes in parameters, we think, are
caused by absent of IDIC dummy interaction terms
on assetl. When we redo the estimations and in-
clude the interaction terms (IDC*Assetl), we find
the interaction terms parameters mostly negative
and roughly in the opposite of the assetl param-
eter alone. More specifically we find the net nu-
merical value (after substracting the individual
effect with interaction terms) to be -6.07, -3.6, -
6.79 and -1.86 which are largely in line with the
initial findings. Therefore the IDIC implementa-
tion reduce the deposit interest rate and the effect
increase along with the size.
The algebraic signs of ast_cost in DD equa-
tion are largely the same. However their (abso-
lute) magnitude are somewhat elevated. In the
initial scheme, the parameter values range from -
4.49 to -1.83 where in the later scheme they are
increased to -9.08 to -4.57. The parameters are sta-
tistically significant using GMM CS, 3SLS and SUR
estimators. It seems that the implementation of
IDIC enable banks to pass more freely the opera-
tional cost to customers without worry that it
would spark withdrawals.
The impact of policy rate differential in DD
equation is somewhat dampened in the scheme
which accounts for IDIC adoption. In the initial
scheme we find the parameters to be in the range
of 0.088 to 0.092 where in the latter scheme they
are slightly declined to 0.066 to 0.088. The param-
eters are statistically significant under every esti-
mators. These findings shows that while they re-
main consistent with the hypotheses however the
impacts are slightly discounted with the adoption
of IDIC.
Though we find that the effect of policy rate
is slightly reduced, nevertheless this is not the
whole story related to monetary policy. Unlike the
findings in the initial scheme, the parameters of
base money supply (M0_l) are found to be nega-
tive and are statistically significant. The numeri-
cal values of base money supply are in the range
of -2.42 to -1.26. These findings tell us that higher
injection of cash to the economy is associated with
the decline of deposit rate:1.26% to 2.42% decrease
for every 1% rise in money supply. The findings
are consistent with the hypotheses.
We still find the impact of NIM in LL equa-
tion as positive despite its weak statistical signifi-
cance (the parameter is statistically important only
with SUR estimator). The numerical values are
somewhat elevated. In the previous scheme the
parameters are in the range of -0.169 to 1.384, now
we find them to be around 0.916 to 2.54.
The findings are still in line with the hypoth-
esis thus the qualitative inferrence stays the same.
Higher NIM correlated with higher loan yield,
however the impact is raised with IDIC adoption.
We think this is due to the evidence that IDIC
implementation helps increase public confidence
(thus lowering cost of funding) then banks could
gather higher NIM.
The impact of CAR remains positive and
except for GMM CS the parameters are mostly
statictically significant. The parameters magnitude
are increased from the range of 0.0024-0.243 in the
initial scheme to 0.086–0.258.  These are quite sig-
nificant increase.  Again the findings are inconsis-
tent with  the hypotheses. Like before we could
address these findings to the evidence of a way of
capital preservation.
The parameters of credit quality are still
negative but suffer a decrease in statistical signifi-
cance. The magnitudes somewhat decline in abso-
lute value from initial scheme. Previously we find
the parameter to be in the range from -0.73 to -
0.23, now we find the statistics to be in the range
of -0.438 to -0.084. These findings are again incon-
sistent with the initial hypotheses. We could use
the previous argument of Indonesian banking spe-
cific feature to explain the findings.
Like the initial scheme, exchange rate has
also a large negative and statistically significant
Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan | PERBANKAN
Vol. 17, No.3, September 2013: 443–462
| 460 |
impact to lending rate. The magnitudes are quali-
tatively the same where in the initial scheme we
find them to be in the magnitude of -5.82 to -3.13,
now we find them to be in the range of -5.03 to -
3.11. These findings are contradicting the hypoth-
eses. We think this also could be attributed the
data characteristics (see our argument above).
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Conclusion
In this study we have outlined the theoreti-
cal foundation in an attempt to evaluate one as-
pect of funding and lending behavior of Indone-
sian banks, particularly the interest rate offer (de-
posit interest rate) and charge (loan interest rate).
Departed from simple model first proposed by
Niehans (1978) and De Grauwe (1982), we design
empirical scheme to to answer the form of inter-
action (state of equilibrium) and factors that might
influence the constellation.
We employ a monthly dataset of banking
and economic aggregates from periode January
2001 to October 2011 (130 observations) to help
answer the research question. There are 16 vari-
ables used in a simultanous equation econometric
model that would be estimated using 4 different
techniques namely GMM TS, GMM CS, 3SLS and
SUR. Two variables namely price of deposit and
price of loan are treated as endogenous.  Employ-
ing different techniques hopefully could help us
in addressing the robustness problem of found
estimates.
We run the empirical schem twice: without
and with accounting for IDIC adoption. The imple-
mentation of deposit protection scheme in Septem-
ber 2005 is expected to alter the banks behavior of
funding and lending pricing.
First important empirical findings is that the
behavior of funding and lending rate is generally
consistent with the theory. The slopes are posi-
tive and statistically significant: (equilibrium) de-
posit interest rate increase as a response to a rise
in (equilibrium) loan interest rate and vice versa
(since they are both endogenous). However un-
like the hypotheses, the slope of LL equation is
greater than one. Moreover since the magnitude
is somewhat comparable to the DD equation, it
also raise the issue of possibility to reach equilib-
rium (the stability).
Second, there are several variables: general
to both DD-LL equation and specific that statisti-
cally significant alter funding-lending behavior and
its equilibrium attainment. The most important
variables (based on their magnitude and statisti-
cal significance) are business prospect, system size,
exchange rate, operational cost and profitability.
In the second tier of importance, we find mon-
etary policy instruments (policy rate differential
and base money supply), quality of loan, capital
and total liquidity to affect the system in various
degree.
Third, the adoption of IDIC does not change
materially the slope of DD and LL hence does not
alter the previous qualitative conclusion. Never-
theless the implementation of IDIC alter the influ-
ence various exogenous variables that have been
obtained from initial scheme. There is a change
that possibly could be regarded as spurious, but
there are several changes that quite material. In
light of this we view the IDIC implementation does
alter the behavior of banks funding and lending.
We could convey several policy implications
derived from the study. They are: (1) The is strong
and important link between funding and lending
market. Shocks in one market could alter the over-
all equilibrium: deposit and loan interest rate. In
this regard, efforts by authorities to stem exog-
enous adverse effect to intermediation activity
should be aimed at both market not only one side.
(2) Business prospect works in opposite ways in
funding and lending market. Better economic en-
vironment would trigger intense competition that
tend to depress loan interest rate but on the same
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time elevate the deposit rate. Authorities should
monitor closely the impact of business cycle to this
behavior dynamic. Moreover since we also iden-
tify lack of stability in the system, it could be a
hint to possibility of price war that could jeopar-
dize the system.   (3) Monetary policy is impor-
tant and works as expected. Therefore authorities
could stimulate the economy with more loose
monetary policy.  (4) NIM is identified as a factor
of influencing the loan yield. We think this opens
a way for moral suation to become feasible policy
alternatives in stimulating economy.
Suggestions
The study also identifies various opportu-
nity for further research. Empirical designs using
bank level data could shed better light in the study
findings and certainly would be valuable. The cur-
rent research theme could also be approached in
terms of dynamic paradigm. Time changing views
of lending and behavior would be very welcome
improvement to current endeavour.
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